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Pakistani President to Visit Romania in August

The Pakistani chargé in Bucharest said on 17 July that President Bhutto will pay a visit there next month. He also will visit Albania and perhaps "other Eastern European countries," according to the chargé.

President Bhutto's selection of Romania as the first Communist country he will visit is not surprising. In late June, Romania became the last Warsaw Pact member to grant diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh. As avowed opponents of the use of military force to settle disputes, the Romanians held off granting recognition until talks were underway between Mrs. Gandhi and President Bhutto. Bhutto's proposed visit to Albania probably reflects Tirana's steadfast support of the Pakistanis. If President Bhutto stops off elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia would appear to be the most likely country. The Yugoslavs, like the Romanians, oppose the use of military force, and they agonized over their apparently grudging decision to support the Indians.

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Yugoslavs Publish Thesis on Youth Problems

The national party conference slated for November will devote itself to the problem of Yugoslavia's youth. Specifically, the question is how to instill the socialist ethic in the nation's young people, many of whom are impatient with the present system and want a better life regardless of ideology. Others are simply disenchanted and/or disillusioned with the inequalities of the self-management system which permits a new, privileged class of bureaucrats and technocrats to flourish and prosper on the labor of others. Of no less concern is the penchant of youth in some regions, such as Croatia and Kosovo, to throw themselves blindly behind regional chauvinism.

The full text of the party thesis, which will be subject to public debate between now and November is available. The

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document appreciates the magnitude of the problem--the economic factors, the unstabilizing effect of a rapidly changing society and the historical heritage of suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of Yugoslavia. The party itself is faulted in the document for not having waged an adequate struggle to capture the imagination and energy of the nation's youth--"along with everything that is possible in a freer circulation of material goods, men, cultures and ideas...we are not sufficiently organized...to ensure an even greater penetration of our ideology..." A major reorganization of priorities is, therefore, in order where youth is concerned.

The thesis calls for a "thorough reform" of the educational system. Here, two objectives are sought: first, to bring the students out of their ivory tower and into contact with the rest of society; and second, to change the social composition of the student body in favor of the children of workers and peasants rather than of party bureaucrats and technocrats. Finally, the thesis calls for stricter admission standards for party membership. Youth will be admitted on the basis of "displayed socio-political activity" and readiness to struggle for party principles.

A recurrent theme running through the document is that despite all the talk about a free exchange of ideas, any hint of disruptive activity such as that which occurred in Croatia last year, will be dealt with quickly and severely. Clearly, the party recognizes its own past errors in handling youth, but it is not carried away with self-criticism and intends to ride close herd on the students. Failure, however, to come to grips with bread-and-butter issues such as better living conditions and more jobs for graduates, coupled with this get-tough policy, could end in a nasty confrontation such as the student riots at Belgrade University in June 1968.

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NOTE: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE REPRESENT  
ONLY THE ANALYSIS OF THE EE BRANCH

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INTELLIGENCER ANNEX

Hungary and the CEMA Session

Hungarian Premier Fock's approving words for the large Siberian cellulose plant, whose upcoming construction was announced at last week's CEMA session, glosses over the fact that Budapest's participation in the project is not voluntary. 25X1

The Hungarians undoubtedly dragged their feet during the subsequent two years of negotiations as they haggled over the terms and level of their contribution. Premier Fock, writing in the Soviet party daily Pravda in mid-May, mentioned that negotiations over the cellulose plant were underway, but then expressed Budapest's dismay when he reaffirmed the Hungarian view that "the investments we make beyond our borders cannot be the only form of supplying our country with raw materials." Budapest may still be looking for ways out of the venture. Hungarian planning chief Pardi, in a separate statement after the CEMA session, said that Moscow and Budapest are still negotiating the dimensions of Hungarian participation. Additionally, Premier Fock may have adopted a new ploy in trying to squelch the project. Fock, who undoubtedly visited the project site when he recently stopped in Irkutsk enroute to Mongolia, played up the environmental theme in his remarks to the press last week--a theme which was neither in the CEMA communique nor played up by other leaders at the session. Fock may have discovered that there has been considerable criticism in the USSR of Siberian cellulose plants, which are notorious polluters, and he may be trying to enlist the aid of the Soviet environmentalist lobby.

Budapest undoubtedly is also galled that neighboring Czechoslovakia, which imports substantial amounts of cellulose from the Soviet Union, is not participating in the multi-lateral venture.

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Hungary's foot-dragging reflects its general reluctance to invest in Soviet raw material extractive and processing operations, an attitude which undoubtedly figured heavily in the Soviet-Hungarian economic discussions this spring. While Moscow wants investment help in developing raw materials, Budapest would prefer to exchange Hungarian exports for Soviet raw materials on a current basis. Judging from the CEMA communique, which claims that work is "in progress" on the joint construction of other establishments that produce raw materials, the Soviet pressures for such arrangements might make the Hungarian position untenable.

Nonetheless, the Hungarians apparently are determined to explore other ways of securing long-term raw material commitments. Both Fock and Polish Premier Jaroszewicz asserted last week that one of CEMA's "priority tasks" is to ensure supplies of raw materials, something that was not mentioned in the CEMA communique. By implication, multilateral investment ventures offer only one means of garnering raw material deliveries. Jaroszewicz was even more explicit, and undoubtedly verbalized Hungarian thoughts also when he pinpointed crude oil as the major problem area. According to the Pole, "the agreed cooperation of the pertinent CEMA countries on supplies of crude oil is an urgent task."

Fock hinted that Budapest would continue trying to secure commitments of vital raw materials (especially oil) through "economic-political" consultations and would not wait for the drafting of long-range economic plans. Previously, Hungarian pressure for such long-term planning was in large part a stalking horse for Budapest's efforts to secure long-term Soviet raw material commitments. Budapest's emphasis on bilateral consultations undercuts in part the efforts of CEMA's planning coordination committee, which was set up in July 1971. Comprised of the state planning committee heads, this committee had been tasked with finding solutions to the problems of cooperation in the raw materials, fuel and power sectors. 25X1

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